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Language Regimes and Political Regimes

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Language Regimes and Political Regimes*

Jonathan Pool

LANGUAGE, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND REGIMES

Politicians have often tried to change language situations. Language specialists, including language scientists, language planners, and language artisans such as authors, have often tried to change political situations. Why? Apparently, those concerned with shaping political reality often believe that they can achieve their purposes indirectly by influencing language, and those concerned with shaping linguistic reality often believe that they can achieve their purposes indirectly by influencing politics. Language and politics are believed interdependent phenomena.

For most of those concerned, the interdependence at any moment takes the form of one phenomenon being an object of action, while the other is an instrument. But it would be a mistake for us to universalize the perspective of one kind of activist at one point in time and treat one of these phenomena as the inherent object and the other as the inherent instrument. Weinstein's introduction to this volume might be read to suggest that essentially all activists have political outcomes as their real goals and use language outcomes as tools. Those excluded from political participation by the official nonrecognition of their language, he says (p. 14), perceive a problem that is "only partially and superficially linguistic." This point of view is popular among those who study the politics of language (e.g., O'Barr & O'Barr, 1976). But the world is full of people with diverse concerns, ordered in multilayered hierarchies of tools and goals. A realistic view appreciates that political power can be used to bring about language change, while language change can be used to redistribute political power. The activist who seeks to preserve a dying language, purify a cosmopolitanized language, exterminate an alien language, or officialize a popular language has immediate linguistic goals. The activist who seeks to be elected to public office, organize a new political party, sue a government for the release of secret information, or tap an opponent's telephone has immediate political goals. In each case, we can usually find ulterior goals if we look or ask, but in each

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case we may also find reasons to believe that the activist truly cares about the outcome that is being immediately pursued. As a working assumption, then, I prefer to treat the interdependence between language and politics as an interdependence between equals.

There are many ways to theorize about the interdependence that may exist between language and politics. One way is to consider the mutual influences of the typical language situations and political situations that people try to bring into being. At any time, there are only a few types of situations that many people have names for and work for or against. We can call these salient types of situations “regimes.” The recurrence of attempted language interventions by political activists and attempted political interventions by language activists may be due to the prevalent belief that language regimes and political regimes influence one another. At its extreme, such a belief would hold that a particular language regime is a necessary and sufficient condition for the achievement of a particular political regime, or that a particular political regime is a necessary and sufficient condition for the achievement of a particular language regime.

Are these beliefs true? Can a particular political regime make a particular language regime impossible, possible, likely, or inevitable? Can a particular language regime do this to a particular political regime? Or are linguistic and political regimes really independent, with each being equally likely or equally easy to effectuate regardless of the other?

The evidence, though fragmentary, appears to support the proposition that some combinations of linguistic and political regimes are indeed impossible or unlikely. This is, at least, the thrust of most of the conclusions reached elsewhere in this book.

LANGUAGE REGIMES AS CONSTRAINTS ON POLITICAL REGIMES

Consider first the evidence that language regimes constrain the possible political regimes that can exist.

Many people consider a “national” political regime the only legitimate one. As generally (if fuzzily) understood, a national political regime is one in which a government is presumed to pursue the collective interests of the members of a supremely legitimate and territorially dominant community and, on this basis, has the right and the power to command its subjects' obedience even when its commands conflict with the commands of other entities or with subjects' individual interests.

The proponents of national political regimes often believe that there are linguistic prerequisites to the achievement of their political goals. Specifically, they typically believe that a national political regime is impossible without the existence of a nation (what I above called a “supremely legitimate and territorially dominant community”) and that a nation, in turn, is impossible without a language that the

members of the community are (virtually) all competent in and use (virtually) exclusively in communication with one another.

Such a language situation can be called a “national language regime”. The belief that it is a prerequisite of a national *political* regime may be false, but to some extent this belief makes itself true. In other words, individuals adhering to this belief will tend not to regard a community as their community and as supremely legitimate, and will not obey a government purporting to pursue the community's interests, unless there is a national language regime. In this sense, we can understand as evidence for their own truth the beliefs that Landau (Chapter 7) and Grandguillaume (Chapter 8) attribute to the elites of some new states in the Middle East and North Africa, and that Jacob (Chapter 3) has found among two centuries of French elites. The Israeli pioneers “realized that spoken Hebrew, employed by old-timers and newcomers alike and taught at all levels in school, was a precondition for nationhood and statehood. ... Turkish leaders, who were set on forging a new nation on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, were equally aware that planning the purification, reform and standardization, and lexical expansion of their language was a precondition for the creation of a new nation with common goals” (Chapter 7). The promoters of the national language regime called “Arabization” in the Maghreb similarly believed that “a national language ... ought to bring about national unity” (Chapter 8). And Jacob (Chapter 3) finds that “the persistence of local dialects was seen as a threat to one free and national French identity”.

Another attribute often perceived in political regimes is “modernization”. A modernizing regime might be defined as one that promotes cultural, economic, and political changes that emulate what are considered advanced societies. Parallel to beliefs about “national” regimes, it is commonly argued that a modernizing political regime cannot come into existence without a modern language regime. Grandguillaume (Chapter 8) reports and supports this belief with respect to the regimes of the Maghreb in North Africa. Two language regimes have been competing there, he says: a modern one with French as its administrative language, and an authentic one with Arabic playing this role. Adoption of the authentic regime prevents the political regime from modernizing its society, because Arabic does not have the terms that must be used by modernizers and their target populations. Furthermore, these terms cannot simply be ordered into existence. Choices must be made among competing terms, and it is not obvious who should have the authority to make these choices. So, in reality, attempts to create modern terms result in multiple sets of terms created by different persons and organizations. Heine (Chapter 9) comes to an apparently opposite conclusion about what a modern language regime (in this case, one facilitating economic modernization) is. He argues that the use of a foreign language for domestic purposes in Africa has inhibited universal competence in the officially designated domestic language. Universal competence in the language (what I called a

“national” language regime above), rather than the lexicon of the language, is the key to modernization, according to Heine. But Heine agrees with Grandguillaume that some aspect of the language regime is a constraint on the creation of a modernizing political regime. Coulmas (Chapter 4) supports at least some of the claims that have been made about anti-modernizing aspects of the Japanese writing system and lexicon. In Coulmas's analysis, a modern political regime comes into being partly through the assimilation of new political concepts into the thought of a people. Japanese in the mid-nineteenth century, he says, made it difficult for its users to learn Western political concepts, because terms appropriate for expressing many such concepts were missing and terminological change in general was slowed by the gap between the written and the spoken language.

Centralization is another important variable describing both political and language regimes. Chaklader (Chapter 5) argues that a decentralized language regime is incompatible with a centralized political regime. As he describes it, the emerging language regime of India is decentralized: the institutions of state government will conduct their business in state languages, while the institutions of the union government will conduct their business in the Union language (Hindi). This difference between central and peripheral languages of government operations will, he argues, prevent the Union government from regulating the activities of the state governments. Union courts, for example, will be unable to review cases decided by the high courts of states, because the opinions and proceedings in these cases will be untranslatable into the Union language with satisfactory fidelity. Likewise, Union auditors will be unable to check the accounts of state governmental entities. Hence, the Union government's power to dictate the behavior of the state governments (what I am calling a “centralized political regime”) will be dismantled.

The language regime may also constrain the position of a political regime on a left-right (or egalitarian-authoritarian) spectrum. Scotton (Chapter 2) distinguishes language regimes according to two main dimensions: the indigeneness or foreignness of official languages, and the ease or difficulty of mass acquisition of competence in any foreign official languages. She argues, with data from Africa and some other regions, that language regimes with inaccessible foreign official languages, which the masses are neither invited nor expected to learn, operate to bring about and maintain elitist political regimes, where powerful parents pass their exclusive privileges on to their children. Dasgupta (Chapter 12) argues (or at least suggests) that a centralized language regime brings about a political regime with a rightist center and a leftist periphery. The rationale for this claim, supported with evidence from India, is that the orientation of the political regime depends mainly on the degree to which the poorer and lower-status groups are organized for political action. A centralized language regime imposes the language of the central region on the whole country. In the central region, therefore, there is no reason for resentment against the language regime, while in the periphery there

is. Resentment in the periphery facilitates the organization of linguistic protest movements, and these in turn can be used as bases for organizing political opposition movements among the hard-to-organize lower-status groups. Political protest is harder to organize in the center, because there are no linguistic protest groups on which it can be built.

POLITICAL REGIMES AS CONSTRAINTS ON LANGUAGE REGIMES

Now consider the evidence for the converse claim: that political regimes constrain the language regimes that can exist. It has often been observed that when a major change takes place in the general political orientation of a government a major change in the government's language policies also tends to follow.

One kind of political regime change is a change in activism. It seems reasonable that revolutionary political regimes (in which the government attempts to transform life rapidly and fundamentally) will in general induce revolutionary language regimes (in which languages are frequently and radically reformed). Weinstein (Chapter 1) makes a general case for a linkage between ideologies of political revolution and drastic changes in language policy. Fierman (Chapter 11) describes revolutionary change in the Soviet language regime during the period of Stalin's leadership, and the subsequent eras of political ossification and then democratization both had what appear to be corresponding consequences for the rate of change in language policy.

A related but distinct pair of regime differences is the difference between what might be called "proselytizing" and "productionist" political regimes, and the difference between what are often called "pluralistic" and "assimilationist" language regimes. Jacob (Chapter 3) asserts that the French regime has become less proselytizing (support-seeking) and more productionist (efficiency- and uniformity-oriented) since the Revolution. Initially, the 1789 government used minority languages to communicate its opinions, but subsequently the uniformity of the population and territory, the abolition of church power, and the creation of a national defense force unencumbered by linguistic barriers assumed a higher priority. As this change toward productionism took place, the language regime became assimilationist, to the point that minority language groups achieved "legal nonexistence" (Chapter 3). A similar pair of changes took place after the Bolshevik Revolution in the U.S.S.R. The earlier, proselytizing Soviet leaders used the many languages of their citizens in order to persuade them to accept the legitimacy of the leaders and their beliefs and policies. Subsequent production-oriented leaders (rightly or wrongly) perceived language diversity in the population as a barrier to optimal resource allocation and as a source of other excess costs. These leaders took steps to make the whole population competent in a single language (Russian) and to repeal policies rewarding (e.g., guaranteeing representation to) the users of

minority languages. An assimilationist intent in these policies was denied, but the denial left many observers and activists unconvinced.

The degree of democracy in a political regime can also have linguistic consequences. Esman (Chapter 10) and Dasgupta (Chapter 12) offer support for the proposition that democratic political regimes will produce more pluralistic language regimes and autocratic political regimes will produce more assimilationist language regimes. The basic idea is that people prefer to use their own native languages. In a linguistically heterogeneous country, a democratic regime will reward rulers and would-be rulers who agree to use the citizens' native languages and who agree to allow the citizens to use their own native languages. An autocratic regime, however, will not necessarily reward leaders for such linguistic pluralism, since they are not subject to popular approval. Drawing on the experiences of several countries in South and Southeast Asia, these two researchers find that political elites manipulate the language regime to promote their political purposes, but in the most democratic of these countries the main purpose is to obtain electoral support and therefore one of the main manipulations is to grant concessions to a multiplicity of language groups. Jacob's (Chapter 3) observation that the 20th-century revival of demands for minority-language rights in France coincided with an increased legitimacy of claims for equality in the enjoyment of public benefits gives further support to this position.

Another typical pattern is that a leftist political regime (one promoting governmentalization of the economy and redistributive policies) replaces a rightist one and then adopts a populist language regime (one giving greater governmental rewards for the use of a language that is characteristic of workers and peasants). Chaklader (Chapter 5) reports that the Indian state of West Bengal followed this pattern in 1977. The state government adopted a law in 1961 making Bengali the principal official language of the state (replacing English), but only after the Left Front took power did the government seriously begin to implement the law. An abrupt move leftward took place in the Canadian province of Quebec in 1977, with the acquisition of a parliamentary majority by the Parti Québécois, and the language regime was similarly made more populist. The new linguistic rules, described by Daoust (Chapter 6), required that many important kinds of public and private communication take place in French, the language characteristic of the poorer part of Quebec's population. Daoust's analysis indicates that the government did not succeed in enforcing its linguistic rules as thoroughly and quickly as it intended, but that its success was substantial: in ten years it turned French in Quebec from an apparently endangered language into a "fait acquis" (Chapter 6), a securely entrenched and valuable—even if not yet dominant in all sectors—language. Scotton (Chapter 2) offers a refinement of this pattern: The rightist (in her terms, elitist) political regime may itself introduce a populist (or at least more

populist) language regime, under the threat of public support for opposition groups demanding removal of the current elite and changes in language policy.

PREDICTING LANGUAGE REGIMES AND POLITICAL REGIMES

The brunt of the research results from other studies in this book that I have summarized above is that language regimes and political regimes constrain each other. The constraints can help us use information about one kind of regime to predict the characteristics of the other kind. Based on the above discussion, it would be reasonable to predict that:

- A country without a national language regime will not have a national political regime.
- A country without a modern language regime will not have a modernizing political regime.
- A country without a centralized language regime will not have a centralized political regime.
- A country with a centralized language regime will have a political regime with a rightist center and a leftist periphery.
- A country without a revolutionary political regime will not have a revolutionary language regime.
- A country with a proselytizing political regime will have a pluralistic language regime, and a country with a rational political regime will have an assimilationist language regime.
- A country with a democratic political regime will have a pluralistic language regime, and a country with an autocratic political regime will have an assimilationist language regime.
- A country with a rightist political regime will have an elitist language regime, and a country with a leftist political regime will have a populist language regime.

If these prediction rules are good, then they can help us forecast and alter the linguistic and the political future. A little reflection on these prediction rules, however, should cause us to worry about their adequacy. The main terms are vague. The rules are apparently capable of generating contradictory predictions, as would be the case if there were a proselytizing autocratic political regime, whose language regime would then be predicted to be both assimilationist and pluralist. Gradations in the attributes of regimes are not provided for. We should wonder whether using these rules will make our predictions substantially more accurate

than if we had merely predicted for each country whatever regime type is most common in the world. And we should also be concerned that the categories in which the rules are formulated may be more arbitrary and elaborate than necessary.

The answer to these concerns about vague, contradictory, crude, weak, and excessively complex predictive rules is not obvious. There are several strategies for seeking the answer. I shall describe five of them and discuss their comparative advantages. One strategy is intimate familiarity with a particular country, yielding reliably predictive intuitions. Another strategy is the comparison of a small number of countries, whose differences are used to suggest refinements in hypothesized prediction rules. A third strategy is the comparison of all countries or large classes of countries, using a few purportedly comparable indicators to test prediction rules and measure their strength. A fourth strategy is conceptual and terminological analysis of the prediction rules themselves, apart from any attempt at empirical verification. A fifth strategy is the construction of models of the mechanisms that might underlie the tendencies described in the prediction rules, with the aim of deriving these and additional rules from a few basic assumptions.

Each of these five strategies has merit. Conversely, each has defects. None of them is a self-sufficient approach to the prediction of linguistic and political regimes.

STRATEGIES 1 AND 2: INTUITIONS AND COMPARISONS

The strategy of developing expert intuitions about the regimes of a particular country (or, more generally, a particular case) and using these intuitions to make regime predictions is widely used in the study of language and politics. In this book, we can find this strategy in the chapters by Chaklader (Chapter 5), Coulmas (Chapter 4), Daoust (Chapter 6), Dasgupta (Chapter 12), Fierman (Chapter 11), and Jacob (Chapter 3). It is hard for persons without their familiarity to dispute their interpretations of past regime changes and their predictions of future ones. But in general this strategy does not seem to work very well. Persons who spend their working lives trying to develop intuitions about a country often fail. In contests for political office, several candidates usually predict (apparently sincerely) that they will win, yet only one does. The majority of business enterprises go out of business within a few months of their initiation. The failing political candidates or commercial entrepreneurs have intuitions about how their country's population will react to their offering, but these intuitions are wrong. One of the most common failings of intuition is to lead its possessor to forecast the continuation of whatever trend is current. When a language begins to die out, experienced observers tend to forecast that it will continue dying out. When a dictatorship begins to crumble, our intuitions usually tell us that democratization will proceed indefinitely. Intuitions are rarely good at helping us predict reversals of trends, such as returns from

pluralist trends to assimilationist ones, or returns from modernization to traditionalism. But reversals occur, and they are even predictable, as Grandguillaume (Chapter 8) points out in his description of the “cycle of Arabization”.

The second strategy, comparing a small number of countries, is valuable for the generation of hypotheses, but of limited use in their testing. Weinstein (Chapter 1) shows that much insight can spring from the informal comparison of groups active in language politics and the policies they pursue. He mines his cases for general tendencies that may (or may not) characterize language universally as an object of policy. Those Weinstein has discovered include the tendency for language change to be an instrumental rather than an essential goal, the dual role of linguistic liberators as linguistic oppressors, and the existence of linguistic false consciousness (the refusal of the speakers of low-status languages to welcome the officialization of those languages). Conclusions drawn from a small convenience sample are, of course, tentative. Any two countries differ in many ways, as Landau (Chapter 7) points out, and we cannot show that one of these differences is the cause of another difference. Nor do any similarities among a small number of cases constitute strong evidence for the claim that these similarities will persist as further cases are examined. Landau finds, for example, that the revivalist language regimes of Israel and Turkey both placed lexical modernization at the end, chronologically. That observation leads easily to the idea that lexical modernization may be the final stage of all programs of linguistic revival. He also finds that language policy in both countries was formulated largely without careful research into the alternatives. Is this a feature of language policy everywhere? The questions are usefully posed, but not yet answered. Likewise, Esman's (Chapter 10) conclusion that pluralistic language regimes promote popular support of the political regime is supported by his interpretation of the handful of cases he studies, as is Scotton's (Chapter 2) proposition that elites, motivated by the preservation of their prestige and power, use their exclusive official language for more purposes than pragmatism would require. But the next difficult step in each case is to design a more rigorous test of the hypothesis, using a large sample of cases or an experimental design.

STRATEGY 3: COMPARING ALL CASES

In principle, the third strategy, which compares the entire population or a large class of countries, can verify the predictive rules that emerge from studies in which only a few countries are compared. But the inclusion of all cases comes at a price. Only a few characteristics of each case are examined, the examination is cursory and second-hand, the most available data rather than the most relevant data are collected, and the sameness of what is measured in the various cases is not convincingly demonstrated. None of the contributors to this book has chosen to

follow this strategy in the research reported here, but this strategy is an important element is the research tradition on language and politics. Let me, then, dwell on it a bit longer, focusing on some unwarranted conclusions that are typically drawn when this strategy is employed.

The kinds of data that can be used when one attempts to include the whole population of countries in one's analysis are illustrated by country statistics on linguistic homogeneity and development available in international statistical handbooks. One such handbook is Banks and Textor (1963), where all strong correlations are automatically translated into verbal descriptive generalizations that can also be read as predictive rules. These include (Table 68):

- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where the degree of urbanization is high.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those whose agricultural population is medium, low, or very low.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those whose per capita gross national product is very high, high, or medium.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend less [my italics] to be those whose international financial status is low or very low.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those whose economic developmental status is developed or intermediate.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where the literacy rate is fifty percent or above.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where newspaper circulation is one hundred or more per thousand.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where the stage of political modernization is advanced, rather than mid- or early transitional.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where political enculturation is high or medium.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where sectionalism is negligible.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where the legislature is fully effective or partially effective.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where the executive is strong.
- Polities that are linguistically homogeneous tend to be those where the bureaucracy is semi-modern, rather than post-colonial transitional.

More finely differentiated data on linguistic homogeneity and national development are easily available from other sources, such as Taylor and Hudson (1972). Their data on linguistic fractionalization (pp. 271–274) and gross national product per capita (pp. 314–321), for example, which I have plotted in Figure 1, show a clear relationship between these two phenomena.

What should scholars and decision-makers conclude from generalizations and plots such as these? The apparent lesson is that countries with high linguistic fractionalization, i.e. countries with several different substantial-size groups of native-language speakers, have little if any chance of being prosperous. Countries with low linguistic fractionalization don't have to be prosperous either, but at least they have some hope of being so. Given the pattern shown in Figure 1 and in the above generalizations, it is no wonder that development-oriented elites in multilingual countries typically perceive a conflict between linguistic pluralism and modernization, and no wonder that they typically propose to solve this conflict by promoting linguistic assimilation.




Figure 13.1. Domestic linguistic diversity and economic productivity of the world's countries

Can fault be found with such conclusions? Yes. The associations shown above between linguistic uniformity and politico-economic development are static, not dynamic. Static associations do not logically imply that an action will cause a change. Specifically, these associations do not imply that the action of making a country linguistically more uniform than it already is will cause that country to become more developed politically or economically than it would have become if the linguistic action had not been taken (Pool, 1972). The reason is that there are other possible explanations for the static associations that have been reported. For one, development may cause linguistic uniformity to increase but not vice-versa, as suggested by Deutsch (1966). Secondly, other forces such as prevailing universalistic beliefs (Lerner, 1958) may promote both linguistic assimilation and politico-economic development. Most plausible of all, increasing linguistic uniformity may promote development under some conditions and retard it under other conditions. For example, it may be true, as Lenin argued (Pipes, 1964, pp. 45–46), that voluntary linguistic assimilation promotes political development but coerced (or apparently coerced) linguistic assimilation damages political

development. Thus, coercing one's country into a linguistic resemblance to developed countries might not bring about the development that they exhibit, even if it is attributable to their linguistic homogeneity.

Static information is generally more available than dynamic information. So world-wide comparisons will usually be comparisons of static indicators. The associations that are found in such comparisons will lead not only to assimilationist language policies, but also to policies promoting domestic use of foreign languages. Static information shows that countries with certain national languages are more powerful and prosperous than average. This fact will superficially appear to imply that a nation that adopts one of those languages for general domestic use will enhance its own prospects for development more than if it adopts one of its indigenous languages or some other foreign language or even an artificial language. But that inference is fallacious. It is possible that any massive change in language use causes harmful side-effects that have not been experienced in countries where language use evolved gradually. It is also possible that the adoption of a language belonging to a rich and powerful foreign country creates economic, political, and cultural dependence (Laitin, 1977) and strangles the channels of professional access and inter-class mobility within the adopting country (Chapter 9).

The dynamic information that would permit intelligent and definitive language policymaking for development purposes is limited, hard to find, speculative, and in appearance tentative. The most sensible inference to be drawn from this fact is that language policies well designed to promote development will also be tentative. They will not be based on excessively confident beliefs about the effects of linguistic assimilation or the benefits of switching to a particular language. Tentative policies on language, as in any domain, provide for experiments, pilot studies, interim evaluations, and efforts to avoid romanticizing any one policy so much that it cannot be changed with experience (cf. Mackey, 1977, p. 348). This style of decision-making, however, appears to be rare in government, particularly when language is the direct object of policy. Overconfidence and unwarranted inferences from static information can lead to fallacious reasoning about cause and effect. As a result, decisions tend to be biased, and biased in particular ways. Such systematic biases have been reported, for example, toward overaggressiveness in international conflicts (Janis, 1972) and underestimation of the efficacy of rewards in improving performance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973/1982). The relative availability of static information appears to cause a similar systematic tendency to exaggerate the role of mass linguistic assimilation as an essential ingredient in national development.

The bias of static information for linguistic assimilationism is just one example of a general tendency. Static information tends to support causal hypotheses that attribute beneficial effects to those demographic characteristics currently prevalent among the most advantaged groups in a society or region. Static information reveals that persons with certain demographic characteristics tend to be unusually

well educated, paid, etc., and the inference is often drawn that these demographic characteristics cause these benefits. Thus, static information tends to support racist, sexist, nationalist, and classist ideas, as well as the idea of linguistic assimilationism.

STRATEGY 4: CONCEPTUAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Even the best empirical testing imaginable cannot verify predictive rules when the terms in them have vague meanings. The fourth strategy listed above, the analysis of the concepts in hypothesized rules and of the terms used to represent these concepts, is appropriate for dealing with this problem. This strategy cannot perform empirical tests, but it can make propositions testable. More commonly, it reveals that propositions are untestable and thereby spares us wasted effort.

No contributor to this book practices this as a principal strategy, but Weinstein (Chapter 1) uses it as an auxiliary one. He analyzes crucial concepts found in theories linking language and politics, including the concepts of “language planning”, “state”, and “political development”. Weinstein's analysis leads him to assert that scholars with different sympathies naturally prefer different definitions of “political development”. We know, too, that scholars with different sympathies have adopted competing definitions of “dialect”, “official language”, “international language”, and other terms used in language policy. Conceptual differences often lurk behind terminological uniformity, and as a result the “correct” translation of a technical language-planning term between any two languages is rarely obvious. Reports of research on language and politics often contain terms that would be likely to receive seriously divergent interpretations. Among these terms are:

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| demand for a language | language use |
| developing countries | linguistic conflict |
| elites | linguistic integration |
| ethnic groups | linguistic pluralism |
| ethnic identity | media of instruction |
| foreign languages | minority languages |
| government | modern technology |
| intelligibility | modernization of a language |
| international language | nation |
| language barriers | nation-building |
| language groups | native speakers |
| language issues | official languages |
| language needs | speech communities |
| language problems | world languages |
| language speakers | |

For example, what does it mean to say, as some reputable researchers have, that “it is less expensive to use one language than to use several”? The assertion sounds clear and even obvious. But it is really unclear and dubious. Using *one* language may mean using only one ever, or using only one at any one time (with major differences in the implications for language learning). *Using* a language could mean making utterances in it, or comprehending utterances made by others in it, or even relaying such utterances through the mails, electronic networks, and other channels (which may or may not require that the relaying agent have any competence in the language). When we say one act is more *expensive* than another, we leave it unsaid whose expenses are being taken into account. Is it just the expenses of the user, or also of others who take part in the linguistic transaction, or of yet others (such as potential overhearers, including even archeologists in future centuries) who are affected as well? It is also unclear whether the expense is measured with or without regard to the benefits generated by the act (in other words, gross or net expenses). And is the cost of changing the current practice to the new one included in the expense (is the “cost” of a unilingual regime, for example, the cost of maintaining it, or also the cost of bringing it into existence)?

The definitions of terms like these can easily make the difference between the truth and the falsity of claims such as the one above. Consequently, such definitions can also determine whether it would be “efficient” or “inefficient” to introduce a language regime involving a multiplicity of official languages.

But would we even recognize such a regime if we saw one? After all, what is an “official language”? This term is used for both scholarly and activist purposes, and scholars are rarely explicit as to whether they are calling “official” whatever languages a government calls “official” or are applying their own definition. The term “official language” is used inconsistently and to varying degrees interchangeably with other terms. Perhaps to avoid blame for discrimination, when one language is called “official” other languages are often awarded other appellations whose meanings are similarly unclear. Generalizing about language policies in Africa, Whiteley (1974, p. 178) says,

While some states feel that they can state their language policy in fairly clear-cut terms, others are reluctant to do this, recognizing that overt recognition of one language may well lead to a series of demands from advocates of other languages which they can ill afford. ... Even when a state feels that it can say that X is the ‘official’ or ‘national’ language, this may be interpreted simply as a recognition that X has an important role to play, as a statement of long-term objectives rather than of an existing situation, or conversely as a temporary expedient rather than as a long-term prospect.

In addition to “official language”, government recognition is given to languages with terms such as these (Falch, 1973; Isaev, 1977; Ostrower, 1965; Sibayan, 1974):

administrative language
auxiliary administrative language
common national language
diplomatic language
first official language
inter-nationality language
international language
judicial language
language of communication among nationalities
link language
national language
official state language
principal language
provincial language
regional language
second native language
second official language
state language
working language
zonal language

There is no regular correspondence between the status granted to a language and the term used to describe that status. Sometimes a term is used without any further description of the status. Sometimes the treatment of a language is prescribed in detail without any of these terms being used. And some governments give de facto statuses to languages without ever declaring that they are doing so or attaching any status designations to languages. Nevertheless, some advocates of language policies insist that the various synonyms for “official language” represent legally and practically different government behaviors. Isaev (1977, pp. 20–21), for example, claims that “official language” implies government imposition, while “language of communication among nationalities” implies voluntary adoption and no special rights for the designated language. To show that this is a meaningful distinction, however, one would need to define criteria for determining whether the use of a second language as a medium of communication results from coercive or voluntary decisions. No advocate of this distinction has offered such criteria.

Evaluating the coerciveness of a government's language policy is difficult. Citizen demands and government actions influence each other; who is to say which came first? The demands of one citizen affect the cost of meeting the demands of another citizen. If government language choices for schools and publications reflect majority preferences, they will generally violate minority preferences. These considerations complicate any attempt to show that a language policy is coercive.

But for that very reason they also frustrate the proof of any claim, like Isaev's, that one government's language policy is coercive while another's is voluntaristic.

The strategy of conceptual and terminological analysis can, however, contribute refined conceptual distinctions to those who follow other analytical strategies. Rather than calling a language regime "egalitarian", for example, we can distinguish kinds of linguistic equality, such as the identical treatment of languages, the equal treatment of languages, and the equal treatment of speakers (Pool, 1987). Stewart (1968) has refined the concept of "official language" by distinguishing ten "functions" a language can perform: official, provincial, wider communication (i.e., domestic *lingua franca*), international, capital, group, educational, school subject, literary, and religious. His "official" function could be further subdivided into an "official use" function and an "official symbolic" function. In most countries today, all of these except the group, literary, and religious functions would be assigned to a language largely by governmental action. When different languages perform different official functions, the questions "How many languages are official?" and "Which languages are official?" are both vague, but distinctions like Stewart's at least reduce the vagueness.

In contrast with Stewart's inductive approach, a deductive approach might also be taken in refining the concept of "official language". For example, one might choose to ignore the substance of communication and pay attention only to its political structure. Every communication that might fall under an official language scheme could be described as having a source and a target. The source could be (1) a unit of government or (2) a person. The target could be (1) a unit of the government, (2) a person, or (3) the public. This typology would yield six kinds of communications. Examples include an interagency memorandum (1→1), a statement by a police officer to someone stopped on suspicion of drunk driving (1→2), a published court decision (1→3), a citizen's letter to the tax collection agency inquiring about a tax refund (2→1), a private physician's advice to a patient (2→2), and labels on packages of food sold by private firms (2→3). Communications of all six kinds could be subject to governmental linguistic requirements, and any such requirement could be understood as an "officialization of a language". The source of each communication might be required to use a particular language, might be required to choose one or more from a specified set of languages, or might have complete discretion in choosing a language. If the target is a person or a government unit, the target might have the right to decide which language the source must use. Insofar as such a deductive scheme for conceptualizing the officialization of languages corresponds to the actual arrangements that governments put into effect, a deductive conceptualization will generally have an advantage of parsimony over an inductive one and will lend itself better to theorization.

STRATEGY 5: MODELING THE UNDERLYING MECHANISMS

We usually think of the relationship between language and politics as complex. Indeed, the first strategy is based on the assumption that the relationship is so complex as to necessitate or justify scholars specializing on the politics of language in single countries. But practitioners of the fifth, or modeling, strategy continue to hope for a few simple and basic laws underlying all the complexity that superficially appears to defeat our attempts at accurate prediction. Inspired by the insight that simple assumptions, when combined, generate complex conclusions, we can imagine simple mechanisms that might possibly drive the behavior of individuals and organizations. These intuitions can be tested by generating predictions of complex behavior from the assumed mechanisms and comparing these predictions with observed reality.

The modeling strategy is an important one in most social sciences, including both linguistics and political science, but it is not represented in this book, nor has it been much used in research on language planning and political development. If it were applied to this subject, the work would usefully complement work guided by the other strategies.

How, for example, might one model the apparent tendency of democratic political regimes to produce pluralistic language regimes? Consider, in the form of assumptions, a few simple mechanisms that might be thought to underly such a tendency.

1. A government has a set of citizens.
2. A government may have a set of one or more official languages (a “language regime”).
3. The cost of a language regime to each citizen (“per-capita cost”) is equal to the number of official languages in the regime (the regime’s “size”).
4. Each citizen has one and only one native language.
5. A set of one or more languages is a possible language regime (“PLR”) if each language in the set is the native language of at least one citizen.
6. A citizen whose native language is official (an “official speaker”) derives a benefit (an “official benefit”).
7. Each official speaker’s official benefit exceeds 1.
8. When allowed to vote on a choice between two PLRs, each citizen votes for one PLR or the other if and only if the citizen’s official benefit (if any) reduced by the per-capita cost (the citizen’s “net benefit”) is greater under one PLR than under the other.
9. If a citizen votes for one PLR over another, the citizen votes for the PLR under which the citizen’s net benefit is greater.
10. If any PLR would win a majority of the votes cast in an election between it and each other PLR, that PLR is the language regime.

11. If no PLR would win a majority of the votes cast in an election between it and each other PLR, the government does not have a language regime.

These assumptions exemplify the arbitrary simplicity of most formal models, but they are perhaps less arbitrary than they seem. For example, it seems arbitrary to assume that each citizen incurs the same cost as each other citizen for a given language regime, but since there is no intention of comparing one citizen's cost with another citizen's cost this posited equality is without effect. The realistic assumption that citizens differ in their tolerance for official language multiplicity is captured by assumption 7. This assumption allows citizens to differ in the benefit they derive from being a native speaker of an official language, as compared with the cost they suffer from each increase in the size of the language regime.

We can now attempt to draw conclusions about how the world would behave if these assumed mechanisms were actually in operation. Would any set of official languages emerge as a language regime? Would it contain exactly one language, all the native languages represented among the citizens, or something in between? Would the languages with the most native speakers be officialized? Would the number of official languages depend on the total number of languages, on the inequalities in their numbers of speakers, or on both? I shall present some conclusions informally, not using the mathematical notation characteristic of the modeling literature.

One step toward answering these questions is to determine how any individual citizen votes when presented with two PLRs. First, when the two PLRs are identical in size and differ only in which languages they officialize, a citizen votes if and only if one but not both PLRs would make the citizen an official speaker. Otherwise, a citizen is indifferent and abstains. In this situation, each PLR gets the votes of its official speakers.

When the two PLRs differ in size, however, the same conclusion does not follow. If a citizen is an official speaker under neither PLR, both PLRs, or only the smaller PLR, that citizen votes for the smaller. But citizens who are official speakers under only the larger regime do not necessarily vote for the larger. Their votes depend on their official benefits, compared with the size difference between the PLRs. If the PLRs differ in size by 1, then they vote for the larger, but not necessarily otherwise.

Since citizens' official benefits can vary, two citizens with the same native language need not vote identically. If they vote differently, however, the difference can occur only in a choice between a larger regime that includes their native language and a smaller (by at least 2) regime that excludes their language.

Having said some things about the voting behavior of individual citizens, what can we say about which PLR wins each pairwise election? First, in an election between two PLRs of equal size the PLR with the greater number of official speakers wins, and if the number is equal neither PLR wins. Second, in an election between two PLRs of unequal size, the smaller wins if the number of its official

speakers plus the number of citizens who are official speakers under neither PLR is more than half the population.

Now we come to the question, does one PLR win elections between it and all other PLRs, thereby becoming the language regime? It seems intuitively plausible that among all PLRs one will, in any given situation, be the most popular, and if it is then it should always receive a majority of the votes when it is paired against another PLR. One can easily imagine that in special cases of exact ties between the sizes of native-language groups (e.g., a country with exactly 10,000 speakers of each of 10 languages) there might not be any language regime that wins all its elections, but is that the only exception? It turns out that that is not at all the only exception. In very general kinds of situations, no regime succeeds in becoming actual.

Consider a 3-language country where the languages all have different numbers of native speakers but no one language has a majority of the population. Making one more assumption about this case, let us posit that each official speaker's official benefit lies somewhere between 1 and 2. In other words, if you are a citizen of the imaginary country, you prefer a size-2 regime with your language official to a size-1 regime without your language official, but you prefer a size-1 regime without your language official to a size-3 regime with your language official.

In any country meeting these assumptions, no language regime can ever be adopted! Let us call the language with the most speakers *A*, the language with the next most speakers *B*, and language with the fewest speakers *C*. There are 7 possible language regimes. We can call them *A*, *B*, *C*, *AB*, *AC*, *BC*, and *ABC*. If we pair them in the 21 possible ways, we find that no regime wins all the elections in which it is a candidate. *A* beats all the other regimes except *BC*, and this leaves *BC* as the only regime that might possibly win all its elections. But it doesn't win them all: it wins only its elections against *A* and *ABC*. What we have in this system, then, is abundant cycles of collective preferences. For example, *A* beats *B* and *B* beats *BC*, but *BC* beats *A*.

This is only one example of the conclusions that would emerge from a thorough exploration of the implications of the above assumptions. But what does this conclusion give us? By itself, it gives us, at best, insight into why things are as they are. Democratic political regimes often fail to decide permanently which language or languages to officialize. Why do they have this problem? One reason may be precisely that in many situations it is impossible to find any decision that unambiguously commands "majority" support. Models of democratic choice have shown that in general an unambiguous majority preference can be guaranteed if all the alternatives and all the voters can be portrayed as occupying various points on a single dimension, but not otherwise. When preferences do not satisfy this restriction but are assumed random, then the likelihood of an unambiguous majority winner approaches zero if there are many voters and many alternatives (Ordeshook, 1986, pp. 58, 162). The assumptions made above were designed to

make the language issue as simple as possible without being ridiculously unrealistic; for example, no interaction between the language issue and any other issues was assumed. But even these assumptions turn out to make language officialization a two-dimensional issue, not a one-dimensional issue. It is two-dimensional because a citizens' preference orderings among PLRs depends on two properties which vary at least partly independently of one another: (1) which languages are included in the PLRs and (2) the PLRs' sizes. Consequently, if it is reasonable to assume that both of these considerations affect people's preferences among language regimes, then it is also reasonable to doubt that democratic choices among such regimes will be clear and stable.

CONCLUSION

My conclusion is about conclusions. Each contributor to this book wants to draw conclusions about the relationship between language policy or language planning and political development, but each is handicapped by the use of one or two among several interdependent analytical strategies. Monostrategic analysis is the norm in this field of study. All our conclusions must be regarded as tentative, even if they are sometimes formulated in words that sound definitive. A combination of the strategies described here would probably give us unprecedented ability to predict changes in both political and language regimes. But can the strategies be combined? In principle, one researcher can combine case studies, comparisons, aggregate analyses, conceptual analyses, and formal models in one body of work, but it is probably more realistic to hope for collaborative combinations instead. This book emerged from a conference at which practitioners of individual strategies met for a week and discussed their research. Their strategies did indeed meet and interact, but it would be an exaggeration to say that they combined. A combination might occur if specialists in the use of different strategies did joint research and jointly published results. To reach this point, the study of language planning and political development could benefit from newly oriented institutional support, but we also need newly modest insight into the only partial understandings that these strategies can individually yield.

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